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Essay 
What Are We Hoping For? Defining 
Purpose in Deterrence-Based Correctional 
Programs 
Cecelia Klingele
†
 
  INTRODUCTION   
Probation has long offered individuals convicted of crime a 
way to avoid the deleterious effects of incarceration and remain 
in the community, bound by conditions designed to help them 
develop the routines and skills essential to a law-abiding life. 
The ultimate goal of probation is to promote desistance, the 
process by which a person formerly engaged in criminal offend-
ing moves to a place of “long-term abstinence from crime.”
1
 This 
process of “making good” is often difficult, requiring a proba-
tioner to abandon the habits and influences that have enabled 
criminal behavior and to develop law-abiding norms and 
prosocial relationships.
2
  
Although probation historically involved close mentoring 
and monitoring by probation officers,
3
 growing caseloads and 
resource constraints often result in lax supervision and uneven 
enforcement of the conditions of supervision.
4
 As a result, in 
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This Essay is derived from a keynote address given at the Minnesota Law Re-
view’s 2014 Symposium, “Offenders in the Community: Reshaping Sentencing 
and Supervision.” Copyright © 2015 by Cecelia Klingele. 
 1. SHADD MARUNA, MAKING GOOD: HOW EX-CONVICTS REFORM AND 
REBUILD THEIR LIVES 26 (2001). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Anne Meis Knupfer, Professionalizing Probation Work in 
Chicago, 1900–1935, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 478 (1999). 
 4. See Joan Petersilia, Probation in the United States, 22 CRIME & JUST. 
149, 150 (1997) (“As a result of inadequate funding, probation often means 
freedom from supervision. Offenders in large urban areas are often assigned to 
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many jurisdictions it is not uncommon for probationers to vio-
late conditions of release with impunity for extended periods of 
time before facing any consequence.
5
 When a consequence is 
imposed, it is often revocation—the termination of probation 
and the imposition of an often lengthy prison sentence.
6
 
When Judge Steven Alm launched the Hawaii Opportunity 
Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) program, he was not try-
ing to innovate. Quite the opposite: he was reacting against a 
model of probation that struck him as being at odds with com-
mon sense and common experience.
7
 As he later explained to 
Congress, from his first week on the bench as a state felony tri-
al judge in Honolulu,  
I could tell that the current probation system was broken. Probation 
officers had caseloads of up to 180, and the dynamic was that offend-
ers would repeatedly break the rules of supervision—by using drugs, 
skipping probation appointments and failing treatment—because 
there were no real consequences. After the offender racked up 20, 30 
or more violations, the probation officer would feel they had a “good” 
case for bringing a Motion for Revocation of Probation . . . and [would] 
almost invariably recommend I sentence the offender to the underly-
ing 5, 10 or 20 years in prison. 
  I saw this dynamic . . . and I thought to myself, “this is a crazy 
way to operate. A crazy way to try to change anybody’s behavior.”  
  I thought to myself, “What did I do as a parent when my child 
misbehaved?” I would repeat the rules and warn him that if it hap-
pened again, I would give him a specific consequence right away. And 
he learned to connect the bad behavior with the consequence, and the 
bad behavior stopped.  
  I thought if we could reorganize this creaky old probation system 
to be swift, certain and proportionate for each and every violation, we 
could more effectively supervise probationers.  
  And HOPE probation was born.
8
 
Judge Alm’s intuitions were supported by a substantial body of 
research on the factors that deter people from engaging in pro-
hibited behavior (whether that means committing new crimes 
or violating conditions of supervision). Key to deterrence is a 
 
100-plus caseloads, in which meetings occur at most once a month, and em-
ployment or treatment progress is seldom monitored.”). 
 5. Id.  
 6. For a more complete discussion of the dynamics of probation and revo-
cation, see generally Cecelia Klingele, Rethinking the Use of Community Su-
pervision, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1015 (2013). 
 7. Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary [hereinafter Statement of Hon. Steven Alm], 111th Cong. (2010) 
(statement of Hon. Steven Alm, Circuit Court Judge), available at http:// 
judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/pdf/Alm100511.pdf. 
 8. Id. 
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belief on the part of the person being deterred (1) that prohibit-
ed behavior will be detected and (2) that an immediate, nega-
tive consequence is certain to accompany any detected viola-
tion.
9
  
Applying that logic to probation supervision meant increas-
ing surveillance of people under supervision to detect more vio-
lations, and building the capacity of the probation agency and 
the court to respond quickly to those violations. Judge Alm did 
just that, creating a new intensive supervision program for 
probationers identified as being at high risk of revocation.
10
 The 
program made use of law enforcement officers who more closely 
monitored and apprehended those probationers who missed 
meetings or failed drug tests, and brought them quickly before 
the court for custodial sanctions usually ranging from several 
days to several weeks.
11
  
After a successful pilot program, Judge Alm persuaded his 
colleagues on the bench to adopt HOPE in their courtrooms, 
too.
12
 According to studies the Honolulu court later commis-
sioned from outside researchers, the program worked spectacu-
larly well: participants increased compliance with rules of su-
pervision, and served less time in prison than people placed on 
traditional probation caseloads.
13
  
The news traveled fast. Media outlets loved the idea of an 
effective, tough-love approach to probation,
14
 and publicized 
 
 9. See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 
42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 206 (2013) (discussing theories of deterrence and their 
implications for public policy). 
 10. Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7. 
 11. See Mark A. R. Kleiman & Kelsey R. Hollander, Reducing Crime by 
Shrinking the Prison Headcount, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 89, 102–03 (2011); 
Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7.  
 12. See Steven S. Alm, HOPE for Your Probationers, 50 JUDGES’ J. 18, 20 
(2011) (reporting that over a six-year period, all felony judges in the Honolulu 
District Court began using HOPE with some probationers). 
 13. See ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
MANAGING DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND CERTAIN 
SANCTIONS: EVALUATING HAWAII’S HOPE (2012) [hereinafter HAWKEN & 
KLEIMAN, MANAGING], available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
229023.pdf; ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, RESEARCH BRIEF: 
EVALUATION OF HOPE PROBATION (2008), available at http://www.colorado 
.gov/ccjjdir/Resources/Committees/DrugTF/Handout/HOPE-ProbationEval_ 
ResearchBrief_HawkenANDKleiman08.pdf. 
 14. See Stephanie A. Duriez et al., Is Project HOPE Creating a False Sense 
of Hope? A Case Study in Correctional Popularity, 78 FED. PROBATION 57, 61 
(2014) (“The tough-love approach towards offenders is popular not just with 
lawmakers but also with the American public. . . . [I]n a survey completed by 
the Pew Research Center, [seventy-two] percent of the 1,284 adults who com-
pleted the telephone interview either mostly or completely agreed with the 
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HOPE’s success in a number of major domestic newspapers and 
magazines.
15
 By 2012, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
and the United States Department of Justice’s Bureau of Jus-
tice Assistance had launched field experiments to replicate 
HOPE in four jurisdictions around the country.
16
 Others fol-
lowed, some funded through the NIJ and others arising out of 
grassroots efforts in counties across the country.
17
 Although 
HOPE replications and derivative programs vary in their spe-
cifics, all rely on the core insight that responding swiftly and 
unfailingly to any violation of a condition of supervision is es-
sential in order to change behavior.
18
  
There is much about HOPE that deserves to be celebrated. 
It shows the power of local officials to bring about change and 
teaches that engagement in the lives of probationers can signif-
icantly affect their behavior. This Essay is neither an attack on 
HOPE’s claims of success, nor is it an attempt to wholly un-
dermine the role of deterrence-based correctional interventions 
in enforcing the conditions of community supervision. It is in-
stead an attempt to engage with the questions HOPE does not 
ask, to show that, at times, the conditions that promote deter-
rence are in tension with the principles of desistance—and 
sometimes with justice itself. When such a tension exists, it is 
necessary to ask why we wish to deter and whether other val-
ues—such as proportionality, concern for human dignity, and 
an appreciation of the dynamics of desistance—should trump 
the very certainty and predictability that deterrence-based 
models demand. 
Following this Introduction, Part I reviews the basics of 
probation supervision and compares standard probation to de-
terrence-based programs like HOPE. Part II examines the dif-
ference between the deterrence that programs like HOPE pro-
 
statement that, ‘The criminal justice system should try to rehabilitate crimi-
nals, not just punish them.’” (citation omitted)). 
 15. See, e.g., Bill Keller, America on Probation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2014, 
at A19; Sam Kornell, Probation that Works, SLATE (June 5, 2013, 6:45 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/06/hawaii_ 
hope_probation_program_reduces_crime_drug_use_and_time_in_prison.html; 
Jeffrey Rosen, Prisoners of Parole, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 8, 2010, at 36. 
 16. See Kevin McEvoy, HOPE: A Swift and Certain Process for Probation-
ers, 269 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 16, 17 (Mar. 2012). The initial sites selected were 
Clackamas County, Oregon; Essex County, Massachusetts; Saline County, Ar-
kansas; and Tarrant County, Texas. Id. 
 17. See Duriez et al., supra note 14, at 57 (citing Beth Pearsall, Replicat-
ing HOPE: Can Others Do as Well as Hawaii?, 273 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 27, 29 
(2014)). 
 18. See Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7. 
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mote and long-term desistance from crime, which is the ulti-
mate goal of probation. This Part also explores the unintended 
ways in which elements of deterrence-based correctional pro-
grams may find themselves in tension with the requirements of 
procedural justice. Part III concludes with a call to use deter-
rence-based correctional programs with greater attention to the 
ways in which they advance or interfere with legitimacy and 
desistance. For all of their promise, these programs (and the 
compliance they promote) should not become ends unto them-
selves. Instead, like any criminal justice intervention, deter-
rence-based correctional programs should be used as tools to 
advance the larger goal of empowering probationers to desist 
from crime—to trade criminality and addiction for more ma-
ture, prosocial modes of living. When the requirements of de-
terrence impede the larger and more fundamental goal of pro-
moting desistance, helping probationers make lasting change 
should trump training them to be compliant.  
I.  HOW HOPE WORKS   
HOPE was a response to the failure of what it often called 
“probation as usual.”
19
 To understand how HOPE works, it is 
first necessary to understand the basic features of probation in 
America today. Although there are widespread differences in 
the structure and functioning of American probation agencies, 
all share common features. This Part first reviews the funda-
mentals of probation, and then explains how HOPE operates 
differently from typical probation, and to what effect. 
A. PROBATION BASICS 
Probation sentences are designed to offer courts a way of 
holding people accountable for criminal behavior without re-
moving them from the community. Traditionally, probation has 
been seen as a way to rehabilitate minor, young, first-time, and 
high-needs defendants, who—with the right kind of interven-
tion and redirection—might reform their lives.
20
 For that rea-
son, early advocates of probation praised it as “one of the 
highest forms of social work.”
21
 
Probation is the most common disposition imposed by 
 
 19. See generally Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7 (describing 
the origins of HOPE). 
 20. Klingele, supra note 6, at 1022–25. 
 21. Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., Probation Progress, 23 CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 915, 920 (1933). 
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American courts in criminal cases.
22
 Although there are 
variations in the way probation is configured in jurisdictions 
throughout the country (in some jurisdictions probation is 
treated as an alternative to a formal sentence; in others it is 
treated as a sentence in its own right
23
), it always includes a 
defined period of conditional release in the community, 
sometimes preceded by a short jail stay.
24
 To successfully 
complete a term of probation, a convicted person must comply 
with a host of court-imposed conditions of supervision that 
usually include regularly reporting to a probation officer; 
avoiding new criminal conduct, including the consumption of 
prohibited substances; attending work, classes, or treatment 
programs; abstaining from alcohol; complying with a court-
imposed curfew; avoiding other individuals under supervision 
or with criminal records; paying restitution and monthly 
supervision fees; and additional restrictions designed to 
promote rehabilitation and contain risk.
25
 In some jurisdictions, 
the probation department is authorized to add additional rules 
to those imposed by the court.
26
 
 
 22. In 2001, sixty percent of those under correctional supervision were 
serving terms of probation. Wayne A. Logan, The Importance of Purpose in 
Probation Decision Making, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 191 (2003). Of the 
6,937,600 adults under the control of U.S. correctional agencies (jails, prisons, 
and community supervision departments) at the end of 2012, 3,942,800 were 
on probation. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 3 
(2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf. 
 23. Compare People v. Daniels, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 887, 891 (Ct. App. 2003) 
(“Although courts sometimes refer to it as a ‘sentence,’ probation is not a sen-
tence even if it includes a term in the county jail as a condition. In granting 
probation, the court suspends imposition or execution of sentence and issues a 
revocable and conditional release as an act of clemency.” (citation omitted)), 
with State v. Hamlin, 950 P.2d 336, 339 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (“With the pas-
sage of the sentencing guidelines, . . . [p]robation is no longer the suspension of 
a sentence; probation is the sentence.”). 
 24. Using jail in combination with probation is a practice often referred 
to as a split sentence. A 1997 study found that split sentences were used in 
approximately a quarter of felony cases. Joan Petersilia, Probation in the 
United States, PERSPECTIVES, Spring 1998, at 30, 35. 
 25. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540(1) (2013); 
N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 107 (2014); see also KELLY LYN MITCHELL ET AL., ROBINA 
INST. CRIM. LAW & CRIM. JUSTICE, PROFILES IN PROBATION REVOCATION 
(2014), available at http://www.robinainstitute.org/up-content/uploads/Robina 
-Report-2015-WEB.pdf (summarizing probation conditions in twenty-one dif-
ferent states). 
 26. See, e.g., ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. ADMIN. § 6-207 (2010) (when supervising 
probationers through interstate compact, “[p]robation departments may add 
additional conditions”); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 20-533(3) (2014) (“As authorized 
by court order, probation officers may establish additional reasonable condi-
tions of probation with which the juvenile offender must comply.”); WIS. 
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The laws governing release conditions are broadly 
permissive; there are very few constitutional restrictions on the 
kind of conditions that may be imposed on probationers, 
primarily because courts treat most probation conditions as 
inherently less punitive than the period of confinement the 
court is otherwise authorized to impose.
27
 In many jurisdictions, 
probationary sentences include a stock set of basic conditions to 
which all offenders are subject.
28
 Those basic conditions are 
often enhanced for specific categories of offenders, including 
those convicted of sex crimes, crimes of domestic violence, and 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated.
29
 In addition, 
courts are authorized to impose additional conditions of 
supervision at their discretion.
30
 These “special conditions” have 
included a wide range of requirements, from ordering 
defendants to write apology letters to holding signs in public 
proclaiming their crimes, to attaching bumper stickers to their 
cars.
31
  
 
ADMIN. CODE § DOC 328.04(3)(s) (2013) (“Comply with any additional rules 
that may be established by an agent. The rules may be modified at any time as 
appropriate.”). 
 27. See Jasmine S. Wynton, Note, MySpace, YourSpace, But Not 
TheirSpace: The Constitutionality of Banning Sex Offenders from Social Net-
working Sites, 60 DUKE L.J. 1859, 1886 (2011) (“Offenders on probation, pa-
role, or supervised release have diminished constitutional rights and thus re-
ceive less constitutional protection than those who are no longer under state 
supervision.”); see also Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. 
REV. 181, 202–07 (1967). 
 28. Heather Barklage et al., Probation Conditions vs. Probation Officer 
Directives: Where the Twain Shall Meet, 70 FED. PROBATION 37, 37 (2006) 
(“Currently, both federal and state probation and parole systems utilize what 
are known as ‘standard conditions of supervision.’ These ‘standard’ conditions 
routinely require the offender to: 1) avoid commission of any new offenses; 2) 
notify the supervising agency prior to leaving the district of supervision; 3) no-
tify the supervising agency of any change in residence; 4) maintain stable em-
ployment; 5) report any new arrests without delay to the supervising agency; 
6) report regularly to the supervising agency; and 7) to comply with any direc-
tives or instructions from the supervising corrections agent.”). 
 29. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3563(a)(4) (2012) (imposing special conditions on 
domestic violence offenders); Id. § 3563(a)(8) (imposing special conditions for 
sex offenders). 
 30. See, e.g., id. § 3563(b) (listing twenty-two discretionary conditions, 
and authorizing “such other conditions as the court may impose”). A study of 
individuals on conditional release in Wisconsin revealed an average of thirty 
conditions per offender, approximately half of which were discretionary. KIT 
VAN STELLE & JANAE GOODRICH, THE 2008/2009 STUDY OF PROBATION AND 
PAROLE REVOCATION 158 (2009), available at https://uwphi.pophealth.wisc 
.edu/about/staff/van-stelle-kit/2008-2009-study-of-probation-and-parole 
-revocation.pdf. 
 31. See, e.g., Ross E. Milloy, Texas Judge Orders Notices Warning of Sex 
Offenders: Car and Home Signs Elicit Praise and Shock, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 
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Many commonly imposed conditions of probation target 
behaviors that are closely tied to probationers’ risk of criminal 
re-offending. These include prohibitions on weapon possession 
for violent offenders and on drug or alcohol use for those with 
substance abuse related convictions.
32
 Many other conditions, 
however, govern aspects of life that are not directly relevant to 
criminal behavior. Curfews, blanket prohibitions on alcohol 
use, and requirements that probationers complete school may 
sound like a good idea to the judges imposing conditions and to 
the probation officers administering a probation sentence—the 
rationale being that life circumstances, such as unemployment, 
poverty, and lack of education increase the risk of harm to the 
community—but they are restrictions on liberty that do not 
closely correspond to the particular risk of criminal harm posed 
by most people under supervision.  
The cumulative effect of these conditions is undeniably 
punitive. The requirements of probation can be daunting, 
particularly for those with limited means. Probationers must 
come up with extra money for monthly supervision fees and 
program co-pays while still paying child support, restitution, 
and ordinary bills; find stable housing; retain a job or attend 
school while never missing court-ordered treatment programs 
and meetings; find timely and reliable transportation to and 
from court appointments, office visits, and counseling sessions; 
avoid socializing with others under supervision or convicted of 
felony offenses (a group that may include family members, 
former associates, and neighbors); kick drug or alcohol 
addictions; ask permission before traveling; avoid alcohol 
(including at weddings and other special gatherings); report 
home by curfew—and all the while remain polite to the 
probation and court officials who have the power to revoke 
probation.
33
 With so many obligations present in any given 
 
2001, at A10 (discussing the requirement that sex offenders post signs on 
homes and vehicles); Dan Slater, The Judge Says: Don’t Get Pregnant. A 
Lapsed Law Now Sees New Life, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2008, at A18, available 
at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122230566090673847 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2015) (discussing the requirement that defendant avoid getting pregnant); 
Cary Spivak & Dan Bice, Front-Seat Ban Adds to Odd Legacy of Judge 
Schellinger, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 18, 2003, at 1B (discussing the ban 
prohibiting probationers from sitting in the front seat of a car). 
 32. One 1995 study of probationers found that “[m]ore than two out of 
five probationers were required to enroll in substance abuse treatment . . . . 
Nearly a third of all probationers were subject to mandatory drug testing . . . .” 
THOMAS P. BONZCAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULTS ON 
PROBATION, 1995, at 7 (1997). 
 33. See Klingele, supra note 6, at 1034–35. 
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case, it is not surprising that violations are common. As one 
experienced probation officer observed, “[I]f you can’t write up a 
report, and cite at least a technical violation, you’re not really 
struggling very hard, because there are so many conditions. 
There’s got to be something that the guy didn’t do right, 
right?”
34
 
Although conditions often seem reasonable when 
considered individually, in the aggregate the sheer number of 
requirements makes compliance with all of them nearly 
impossible for many probationers, especially those whose 
ability to follow directions is already compromised by learning 
difficulties, mental health challenges, and poor education.
35
 It is 
for this reason that studies have repeatedly shown that many 
individuals experienced with the criminal justice system would 
prefer a short term of incarceration to a longer period of 
probation.
36
  
While probation is intended to be an alternative to 
incarceration, it is a disposition that frequently ends in impris-
onment. Recent estimates suggest that more than one-third of 
probationers in the United States either stop reporting to their 
probation agents (abscond) or are terminated (revoked) from 
probation and sent to prison for violating their probation condi-
tions.
37
 Approximately half of the people in U.S. jails, and more 
than one-third of those entering prison, have been incarcerated 
as a result of revocation from either probation or parole.
38
 
Although probation revocation rates vary tremendously from 
one jurisdiction to another and are not perfectly recorded, it is 
clear that in many jurisdictions the failure of community 
supervision accounts for a dramatic portion of new prison 
 
 34. Id. at 1035. 
 35. See infra, Part II.B. 
 36. See DAVID C. MAY & PETER B. WOOD, RANKING CORRECTIONAL 
PUNISHMENTS: VIEWS FROM OFFENDERS, PRACTITIONERS, AND THE PUBLIC 43–
46 (2010). 
 37. Angela Hawken, The Message from Hawaii: HOPE for Probation, 
PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2010, at 36, 37. 
 38. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, WHEN OFFENDERS BREAK THE RULES: 
SMART RESPONSES TO PAROLE AND PROBATION VIOLATIONS 3 (2007) (“[S]hifts 
in practices with respect to parole release and reincarceration for parole viola-
tions accounted for 60 percent of the increase in the nation’s prison population 
between 1992 and 2001.”). Parole is a form of post-carceral community super-
vision similar to probation in its requirements. See also Alfred Blumstein & 
Allen J. Beck, Reentry As a Transient State Between Liberty and Recommit-
ment, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 50, 56 (Jeremy Travis & 
Christy Visher eds., 2005). 
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admissions.
39
  
Why is the probation failure rate so high? Many factors, 
both cultural and legal, drive revocation rates.
40
 Cultural 
influences include risk aversion—in a time when crime makes 
the headlines, many probation agencies have little tolerance for 
any infraction.
41
 Others lack meaningful alternative sanctions 
to revocation, such as day community-based programs and 
short-term detention options.
42
 Some agencies (and the courts 
and district attorney’s offices with whom they partner) simply 
hold fast to the conviction that probation is a “second chance” 
and that probationers don’t deserve a third if they are 
unwilling or unable to comply with the conditions of their 
release.
43
  
The legal authority to revoke probation arises whenever a 
probationer violates a condition of supervision. Such violations 
are rampant, in large part because the number and breadth of 
conditions imposed make slip-ups nearly unavoidable. Yet 
despite the frequency with which probationers violate the 
conditions of their release—or perhaps because of it—not every 
 
 39. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 10 
(2014), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf. 
 40. See generally Klingele, supra note 6, at 1045–47. 
 41. Although there are many examples of cases in which people under 
community supervision have committed crimes that drew public attention, the 
most cited case is that of Willie Horton, a prisoner on furlough who brutally 
murdered a Massachusetts couple. See Robert S. Blanco, Mixing Politics and 
Crime, 59 FED. PROBATION 91, 92 (1995). Public outrage about his crime has 
been repeatedly blamed for costing Michael Dukakis the presidency in 1988. 
Id. 
 42. For a description of meaningful intermediate sanctions, see generally 
NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND PROBATION: 
INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM (1990) (ad-
vocating for increased use of intermediate punishments instead of the ex-
tremes of prison and probation). 
 43. The rhetoric of “second chances” abounds in case transcripts. See, e.g., 
Brief of Respondent at 29, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2007) (No. 08-7412) 
(“[Defendant] was given a second chance by having adjudication withheld, 
serving one year in county jail, and being placed on probation.”); Answer Brief 
of Appellee at 4, Smith v. Florida, 143 So.3d 1023 (2014) (Nos. 4D12-3812, 
4D12-3813, 4D12-3814, and 4D12-4174), (“He has had a second chance when 
he should have been sentenced, in theory, to prison initially.”); Government’s 
Response to Defendant’s Objections to Presentence Report, United States v. 
Vargas-Aguirre, 2007 WL 2973622 (D. Ariz.) (No. CR 06-430-TUC-DCB) 
(“[Y]ou were on probation . . . when you did this . . . . You asked for a second 
chance . . . . You don’t get a second chance from me, or a third chance from 
me.”). It has also been echoed in numerous interviews of probation and prose-
cution officials conducted by the author as part of the University of Minnesota 
Robina Institute’s Probation Revocation Project. For more information on that 
project, see http://www.robinainstitute.org/probation-revocation-project. 
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violation leads to formal sanction.
44
 
Since probation officers are not omnipresent, many 
violations go undetected.
45
 Others, while detected, seem minor 
enough that officers may overlook them.
46
 Often, the paperwork 
required to file for revocation is sufficiently time-consuming 
that officers are loathe to bring a probationer before the court 
unless he or she has committed a significant offense or accrued 
a laundry list of technical violations.
47
  
Such was the case in Honolulu when Judge Alm began 
presiding over criminal cases. Probation officers, overloaded 
with large caseloads and with few sanctioning options short of 
revocation, would allow violations to accrue for months or more 
before finally filing petitions to revoke and to send the violators 
to prison, often for lengthy periods of time.
48
 HOPE arose out of 
Judge Alm’s efforts to increase compliance with conditions of 
supervision while simultaneously reducing the number of 
probation cases ending in revocation. 
B. WHAT HOPE DOES DIFFERENTLY 
The idea that predictable punishment decreases crime is 
inherent in the ordering of most civilized systems of govern-
ance. It was first articulated in modern terms by Cesare 
Beccaria, who denounced the overly punitive criminal justice 
practices of his day, in which minor crimes often resulted in 
capital sentences, and advocated instead for less severe pun-
ishments imposed with certainty and immediacy.
49
 Those same 
principles have been affirmed by modern students of deter-
rence.
50
 Studies have repeatedly shown that people tend not to 
be deterred by harsh punishments, but can be deterred by the 
reasonable expectation of detection, even when accompanied by 
the anticipation of only modest punishment.
51
  
 
 44. See, e.g., Hawken, supra note 37, at 40. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. (“Because violation rates were high . . . no probation officer had the 
time to write up every violation, and no judge would have had the time to hear 
all those cases had they been filed.”). 
 48. See Alm, supra note 12, at 18.  
 49. See generally CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (5th 
ed. 2009) (1764) (advocating for reform of mid-eighth century criminal justice). 
 50. See generally Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence 
in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 
91 GEO. L.J. 949 (2003) (questioning the effectiveness of current deterrence 
strategies). 
 51. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect 
of Perceived Severity of Punishment, 59 SOC. FORCES 471 (1980) (finding that 
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Intuitively conscious of those principles, Judge Alm reor-
ganized the way probation was operating for those at highest 
risk of revocation.
52
 For those individuals—and only for those 
individuals—he devised a system that would provide a rapid 
response to all detected violations (which were predominately 
missed appointments and failed drug tests) and ensure a 
speedy hearing and immediate sanction short of revocation.
53
 It 
was his hope that by getting the word out that rule violations 
were taken seriously in his courtroom, probationers would start 
taking rules seriously and would begin to comply with them.
54
 
Doing so would not only prevent lengthy prison sentences upon 
revocation, he conjectured, but would also improve the legiti-
macy of the larger system.
55
  
Eager to put the program to testing by outside experts, 
Alm sought evaluation. In 2007, Angela Hawken from Pep-
perdine University and Mark Kleiman from UCLA obtained 
grants from the National Institute of Justice and the Smith-
Richardson Foundation to perform a randomized controlled 
study of the effects of HOPE.
56
 Their study yielded dramatic re-
sults: they found that probationers who participated in HOPE 
served the same amount of jail time (in the form of pre-
revocation sanctions) as their “probation-as-usual” counter-
parts but were only sentenced to approximately one-third the 
 
perceived severity of punishment deterred only when combined with high lev-
els of perceived certainty in punishment); AM. CORR. ASS’N, RECLAIMING 
OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY: INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS FOR PROBATION AND 
PAROLE VIOLATORS (Edward E. Rhine ed., 1993) (concluding that intermediate 
sanctions can help ease overcrowding problems in U.S. prisons).  
 52. The best deterrence-based correctional programs avoid using high in-
tensity supervision for all probationers, but only for those whose behavior 
places them at highest risk of revocation and re-offense. Studies have shown 
that providing intensive services and supervision to low risk individuals tends 
to increase their overall risk by exposing them to higher risk offenders (in pro-
grams and at probation offices) and by detecting minor violations unlikely to 
escalate and that do not otherwise warrant a formal response. See, e.g., 
ALISON LAWRENCE & DONNA LYONS, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE STATE SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS 11 (2011), available at http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/pew/ 
WGprinciplesreport.pdf (advocating for tailored supervision of parolees); 
Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding the Risk 
Principle: How and Why Correctional Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Of-
fenders, 2004 TOPICS IN CMTY. CORRECTIONS 3, available at http://www 
.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/ccjr/docs/articles/ticc04_final_complete.pdf (discussing 
risk principle and its implications in the corrections context). 
 53. See Statement of Hon. Steven Alm, supra note 7. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Alm, supra note 12, at 18.  
 56. Id. at 20. 
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amount of prison time as the control group.
57
 In other words, 
more immediate jail sanctions during the period of probation 
led to fewer probation failures overall.  
Soon policy institutes, government agencies, and local ju-
risdictions were clamoring for more HOPE, both in Hawaii and 
on the mainland. The Kennedy School of Government at Har-
vard University named HOPE one of the top twenty-five inno-
vations in government in 2013,
58
 and the Institute for Behavior 
and Health dramatically asserted that “HOPE holds the prom-
ise of significantly reducing the demand for illegal drugs, crime, 
and prison populations across the U.S.”
59
 In addition to acclaim, 
the project has drawn committed interest from jurisdictions 
across the country who have tried to replicate it, in full or in 
part. According to Professor Hawken, there are “at least 40 ju-
risdictions in 18 states that have implemented similar mod-
els.”
60
  
Some scholars have expressed skepticism about the dra-
matic reductions in violations HOPE claims to effect. These 
critics have challenged the reliability of the research design 
used to obtain the favorable evaluation results and questioned 
the degree to which Hawaii’s experiment with HOPE is export-
able to other jurisdictions with different probation populations 
and local dynamics.
61
 Even if critics are right, however, and the 
results of programs like HOPE are less dramatic than current 
reports suggest, it appears that HOPE does at least reduce the 
violations of supervision for which it monitors probationers, 
and thereby reduces to some degree the risk of revocation for 
those under supervision.  
But how? One of the most important aspects of deterrence 
to which HOPE has been attentive is the need to target for in-
tervention individuals who are at risk of being revoked.
62
 From 
the beginning of the program, the probationers selected for the 
 
 57. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, MANAGING, supra note 13, at 4.  
 58. See Kornell, supra note 15. 
 59. ROBERT L. DUPONT, HOPE PROBATION: A MODEL THAT CAN BE 
IMPLEMENTED AT EVERY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 1 (2008), available at 
http://ibhinc.org/pdfs/HOPEPROBATION2.pdf. 
 60. Duriez et al., supra note 14, at 57. 
 61. See generally id. (arguing that Project HOPE may not be as effective 
in other jurisdictions as it is in Hawaii); see also Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel 
S. Nagin, Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced? in 10 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 39 (2011) (questioning whether there is suffi-
cient evidence to suggest that “Project Hope can be extrapolated to the rest of 
the United States”). 
 62. Alm, supra note 12, at 18–19. 
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program were those in danger of being revoked to prison be-
cause of repeated violations of the conditions of their release.
63
 
This seemingly small detail matters: insofar as a goal of HOPE 
and related programs is to prevent the harsh sanction of proba-
tion revocation, the individuals targeted for close monitoring 
should be those who, without such intervention, would be likely 
to end up incarcerated rather than those whose behavior would 
not otherwise warrant formal sanction and whose probation is 
likely to terminate successfully. The reason for this is simple: 
as discussed above, minor violations of supervision conditions 
are nearly unavoidable. If watched closely enough, any proba-
tioner could come to the attention of officials for failing to re-
turn home before curfew, filing a late reporting statement, or 
being caught having a beer at a ballgame. If one of the goals of 
programs like HOPE is to prevent revocation and imprison-
ment, then it is essential not to widen the net of governmental 
social control or impose intensive supervision on individuals 
who would not otherwise be prison-bound.  
Once the right people have been targeted, it is necessary to 
create a system for reliably detecting violations. While that 
may sound challenging given the limited number of probation 
officers and the relative freedom probationers have to go about 
the community unobserved, many common violations are easily 
detected. Probation officers routinely track new arrests, missed 
visits with probation officers, missed and failed drug tests, fail-
ure to file financial reporting statements, and failure to pay 
restitution and supervision fees.
64
 For HOPE to meet its goal of 
deterring violations of these conditions, officers must keep close 
tabs on probationers’ compliance and act quickly when non-
compliance is discovered.
65
 Other violations are more difficult to 
 
 63. Notably, this requirement arose at first from mere expedience: Judge 
Alm and his probation staff recognized that they did not have the capacity to 
respond in a timely way to violations by all probationers. See Hawken, supra 
note 37, at 41. Consequently, for the purpose of minimizing paperwork, HOPE 
began only with those probationers who were likely to face revocation if their 
behavior did not change. Id. 
 64. Importantly, these easily detected violations may not be those most 
important to advancing public safety or promoting desistance. Familial vio-
lence, fraud, unauthorized contact with vulnerable individuals, and changes in 
employment status can be more difficult violations to detect and often have far 
greater bearing on how well a probationer is moving toward desistance than 
whether he paid a monthly fee or had a beer—particularly if he is poor and is 
not an alcoholic. 
 65. That often means streamlining case management systems and en-
couraging probation officers to be as on top of their own paperwork as the of-
ficers require probationers to be. See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE 
FORCE FAILS: HOW TO HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT 34–37 (2009) 
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detect but often become apparent when agents engage in more 
intense supervision and have frequent contact with probation-
ers, particularly in their homes or in other locations in the 
community. Mothers, girlfriends, and other personal contacts 
often reveal information to officers about violations of probation 
upon which the agents can—and, if deterrence is the goal, 
should—act.
66
  
Punishment deters best when it swiftly follows an infrac-
tion.
67 
Consequently, when violations come to the attention of 
probation officers, programs like HOPE require officers to re-
spond with a near-immediate sanction. To make this possible, 
courts must create opportunities for regular status hearings on 
violations so that probationers who are apprehended can re-
ceive quick punishment. Ordinarily, hearings are held within 
seventy-two hours after a violation has been detected.
68 
At that 
time, a sanction is imposed, which usually consists of several 
days’ incarceration, though the length of custody may increase 
with repeated violations.
69
 
Consistent, unwavering punishment is an essential feature 
of any program based on a deterrence model. The reason for 
this is twofold. First, consistency in punishment lends legitima-
cy to the system.
70
 Consistent punishment sends the message to 
both probationers and members of the public that all proba-
tioners are held to the same standard and will be treated equal-
ly when they fail to meet expectations.
71
 Judge Alm has ex-
 
(describing Hawaii probation officers’ concerns about the time demands swift 
reporting placed on them). 
 66. There is a danger in this kind of surveillance. While it may bring to 
light violations that probation officers need to sanction if they wish to obtain 
maximum deterrence, it can simultaneously fracture important relationships 
in probationers’ lives, turning formerly trusted confidants and allies into state 
informants. Cf. ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN 
CITY (2014) (describing the roles played by women in informing on men under 
supervision and the detrimental effects of those roles on men’s connections to 
their families). 
 67. See Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About 
Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765 (2010) (discussing 
deterrence of crime through sanctions). 
 68. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, MANAGING, supra note 13, at 13. During the 
time between detection and the violation hearing, probationers are usually 
held in custody. Some modification on this practice may be made when the 
probationer contests the violation. In those cases, probationers are provided 
with counsel and given a later court date. In many jurisdictions employing the 
HOPE model, probationers who contest their violation and are found guilty 
are given harsher sanctions than those who confess guilt at the outset. 
 69. Hawken, supra note 37, at 37. 
 70. See id. at 38. 
 71. Id. 
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plained, “When the system isn’t consistent and predictable, 
when people are punished randomly, they think, My probation 
officer doesn’t like me, or, Someone’s prejudiced against me . . . 
rather than seeing that everyone who breaks a rule is treated 
equally, in precisely the same way.”
72
 
The second reason why punishment is mandated in every 
case is that deterrence occurs only when probationers have rea-
son to believe that pain will follow any breach of the rules. 
Simply put, HOPE seeks to condition probationers to avoid rule 
violations and to engage in required activities.
73
 The more pre-
dictable the punishment, the more likely the probationer will 
be conditioned to avoid it.
74
  
Because the behavioral training on which the HOPE model 
relies requires absolute predictability, there can be no deviation 
from the pre-ordained punishment; to do so would necessarily 
compromise the model’s deterrent effect.
75
 That means that in-
dividual characteristics of probationers, or the life circumstanc-
es that led to violating any particular rule of supervision on any 
given occasion, cannot be considered by the court when sanc-
tioning.
76
 An appointment that is forgotten or missed due to a 
late bus must be punished the same as an appointment that is 
willfully ignored. Drug use that follows the death of a loved one 
is not distinguished from drug use that follows a night of party-
ing with friends. The goal of deterrence-based correctional pro-
grams is to prevent future violations, and punishment teaches 
probationers to order their lives in ways that avoid violations, 
whether that means keeping a better calendar, catching an ear-
lier bus, or finding new ways to cope with grief.
77
 Conditioning 
only works if there is pain that outweighs the pleasure of the 
activity being deterred. 
This insensitivity to personal characteristics or circum-
stances has benefits beyond its deterrent effect: it is quick and 
relatively cheap. HOPE violation hearings average seven 
minutes.
78
 Expensive drug treatment is not ordered for all par-
ticipants. Though treatment may be requested by anyone who 
desires it, treatment is mandated only for individuals who re-
 
 72. Rosen, supra note 15, at 38. 
 73. See Hawken, supra note 37, at 40. 
 74. See B. F. SKINNER, SCIENCE AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 67–70, 173 (1953). 
 75. See Hawken, supra note 37, at 40–41. 
 76. See HAWKEN & KLEIMAN, MANAGING, supra note 13, at 9. 
 77. See id. at 57. 
 78. See id. at 30. 
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peatedly fail drug tests.
79
 
Although deterrence theory mandates punishment for all 
violations, it does not prescribe what punishment is needed to 
ensure that a probationer will be optimally deterred. Programs 
that have utilized the “swift and certain” sanctioning model 
adopted by HOPE vary considerably in the kinds of sanctions 
they impose for minor, routine violations. When HOPE began, 
sanctions for a missed appointment or failed drug test ranged 
from several days (served on the weekend) to several weeks.
80
 
Other programs following the HOPE model have imposed sanc-
tions ranging from a day to a month in jail, depending on the 
severity and frequency of violations.
81
 These periods of deten-
tion are sometimes referred to as “micro-sanctions” or “micro-
punishment”
82
—terms that distinguish the shorter periods of 
detention imposed for rule violations from the much lengthier 
periods of imprisonment that would otherwise be imposed upon 
revocation.  
So: detection, quick response, and modest but unwavering 
 
 79. Id. at 27; see KLEIMAN, supra note 65, at 4.  
 80. Hawken, supra note 37, at 38, 42; Kleiman & Hollander, supra note 
11, at 102. 
 81. See, e.g., MICH. STATE COURT ADMIN. OFFICE, DEVELOPING AND 
IMPLEMENTING A SWIFT AND SURE SANCTIONS PROBATION PROGRAM IN 
MICHIGAN app. A (2014), available at http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/ 
SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Manuals/Specialty/SSSPPManual 
.pdf (reporting sanctions of 3–30 days); MEREDITH FARRAR-OWENS, VA. 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, IMMEDIATE SANCTION PROBATION PILOT 
PROGRAM (2012), available at http://hac.virginia.gov/committee/files/2013/09 
-16-13/Immediate_Sanction_Probation_Pilot_Project.pdf (listing sanctions of 
3–10 days); Paul Suarez, Probation Violations Will Result in ‘Swift and Cer-
tain’ Penalties, COLUMBIAN (May 22, 2012), http://www.columbian.com/news/ 
2012/may/22/swift-and-certain-penalties-officials-hope-short-i (“In the past, 
corrections officers had few options when dealing with violations. Now state 
law says minor violations—including failing drug tests, not reporting to offic-
ers or not going to treatment—will send offenders to jail for one to three 
days.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 15 (“A few jurisdictions have tried to make 
parole and probation less of a revolving door back to prison, with some encour-
aging results. . . . They employ a disciplinary approach called ‘swift and cer-
tain,’ which responds promptly with a punishment for missing an interview or 
failing a drug test. The punishments start small, then escalate until the of-
fender gets the message and changes his behavior—preferably before he has to 
be sent back to prison.”); Josh Marquis, Op-Ed., Bergin Best Bet for Sheriff, 
DAILY ASTORIAN (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.dailyastorian.com/20120306/guest 
-column-bergin-best-bet-for-sheriff (“Right now it is not uncommon for some-
one to test dirty several times before there is any consequence. And I’m not 
talking about sending someone who keeps using meth to prison for three 
years. That doesn’t happen. I’m talking about a ‘micro-sanction’ of maybe five 
to 10 days.”).  
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punishment are the three features of HOPE most responsible 
for its deterrent effects. 
II.  WHAT IS THE COST OF DETERRENCE?   
Probation does many things, but most fundamentally it of-
fers people convicted of crimes the opportunity to be held ac-
countable for their past criminal conduct while taking steps to 
create and sustain a law-abiding future. With that goal in 
mind, it is helpful to review what we know about how human 
behavioral change occurs and to compare that to the dynamics 
of deterrence-based correctional programs like HOPE. 
A. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN DETERRENCE AND DESISTANCE 
Deterrence is a strategy that seeks to prevent misconduct 
through punishment for prohibited behavior.
83
 Desistance is the 
process by which people move from active criminal offending to 
a life that does not involve crime.
84
 Deterrence is focused on the 
here-and-now: if I make the near-immediate consequences un-
pleasant enough, I can stop you from engaging in criminal be-
havior. Successful deterrence is measured by whether you 
commit any crime.
85
 Desistance takes a longer view. Efforts 
that promote desistance anticipate that moving from a life in 
which crime is common to one in which it is nonexistent takes 
time and requires the development of a new prosocial identity 
with attendant prosocial relationships.
86
 Successful desistance 
is demonstrated by improvement in the frequency and severity 
of criminal offending.
87
 
Insofar as the end of the desistance process is the absence 
of criminal offending, deterrence and desistance can overlap. 
Strategies that promote deterrence are intended by the state to 
promote or hasten desistence on the part of individuals who 
 
 83. Robinson & Darley, supra note 50, at 950 (“Lawmakers have sought to 
optimize the control of crime by devising a penalty-setting system that assigns 
criminal punishments of a magnitude sufficient to deter a thinking individual 
from committing a crime.”). 
 84. MARUNA, supra note 1, at 17 (“Desistance from crime is an unusual 
dependent variable for criminologists because it is not an event that happens, 
rather it is the sustained absence of a certain type of event (in this case, 
crime).”); John H. Laub & Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from 
Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1, 8 (2001). 
 85. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 50, at 953–56. 
 86. See MARUNA, supra note 1, at 34. 
 87. See Laub & Sampson, supra note 84, at 8–9. See generally MARUNA, 
supra note 1, at 19–35 (discussing different definitions and explanations for 
desistence). 
2015] WHAT ARE WE HOPING FOR? 1649 
 
engage in criminal behavior—preferably sooner rather than 
later. Deterrence-based correctional programs, like HOPE, seek 
to skip the “process” part of desistance, and by design they try 
to move an offender from offending to law-abiding with no in-
termediate transition.
88
 Such a plan may work well for individ-
uals whose involvement in the criminal justice system is minor 
or fleeting and for whom crime is an abberration. However, for 
those with lengthy criminal records, and for those whose crimi-
nal offending behavior is tied to addiction, mental illness, or 
past trauma, “quitting crime” tends not to be the result of a 
single encounter with punishment.
89
  
How does desistance work, then? Research into the causes 
of desistance suggests that much like breaking any bad habit, 
giving up a life of crime is a process that happens in fits and 
starts.
90
 Repeat offenders do not usually turn into Boy Scouts 
overnight; instead, people who “go straight” gradually increase 
intervals between offending behaviors, which also tend to de-
crease in severity over time.
91
 A key factor in this change in-
cludes the development of strong bonds of informal social con-
trol, primarily through acquisition of stable employment or 
marriage.
92
 In many cases, change also requires an individual 
to develop a new self-narrative that allows him to make sense 
of his past while taking ownership of his present and future. In 
the context of drug addiction, for example,  
[b]reaking away from the drug and the addict world—both symboli-
cally and literally—is a crucial part of the desistance process. At the 
same time, addicts need to forge new relationships, new interests, and 
new investments in order to maintain cessation from drugs. The re-
sult of this process is an identity transformation.
93
 
Research on desistance echoes many of the principles that 
the psychological community has identified as essential to re-
covery for those suffering from both addiction and mental ill-
ness. In 2005, the United States Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) convened a “Na-
tional Summit on Recovery” to gather experts in the field of ad-
 
 88. See generally MARUNA, supra note 1, at 19–37 (discussing the desist-
ence process). 
 89. Id. at 17. 
 90. Id. at 26–27. 
 91. Id. at 19–35. 
 92. See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON & JOHN H. LAUB, CRIME IN THE 
MAKING: PATHWAYS AND TURNING POINTS THROUGH LIFE (1993) (providing a 
general perspective that advocates examination of intra-individual change 
across the life-course). 
 93. Laub & Sampson, supra note 84, at 34–35 (citing PATRICK BIERNACKI, 
PATHWAYS FROM HEROIN ADDICTION RECOVERY WITHOUT TREATMENT (1986)). 
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diction and mental illness to identify “guiding principles of re-
covery.”
94
 Among the twelve principles identified were many 
relevant to desistance, including the following: 
Recovery is self-directed and empowering. 
Recovery involves a personal recognition of the need for 
change and transformation. 
Recovery is holistic. 
Recovery has cultural dimensions. 
Recovery exists on a continuum of improved health and 
wellness. 
Recovery emerges from hope and gratitude. 
Recovery involves a process of healing and self-redefinition. 
Recovery involves addressing discrimination and trans-
cending shame and stigma. 
Recovery is supported by peers and allies. 
Recovery involves (re)joining and (re)building a life in the 
community.
95
 
What is striking about both recovery principles and de-
sistance narratives is the degree to which they are personal. An 
individual’s ability to redefine himself as a person who lives a 
law-abiding life is an endeavor that requires reflection, healing 
from past trauma, and patience with the process (or “continu-
um”) of becoming well.
96
 It also requires a great amount of self-
reflection and self-initiative, a fact that has led some scholars 
to question whether a probation program that functions solely 
on conditioning can have any lasting effect: 
[S]wift-and-certain theory says little about why offenders will obey 
the law once they are off probation and no longer subject to any sanc-
tions, swift or otherwise. It is possible that swift-and-certain proba-
tion will interrupt offenders’ involvement in crime long enough that 
the extinction of the behavior will occur, making post-probation pun-
ishment unnecessary. But psychological research also would predict 
that the effects of punitive sanctions will attenuate once surveillance 
is no longer omnipresent and the sanctions are rarely imposed.
97
 
When the characteristics of individuals at risk of revoca-
 
 94. CORI KAUTZ SHEEDY & MELANIE WHITTER, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND ELEMENTS OF RECOVERY-ORIENTED 
SYSTEMS OF CARE: WHAT DO WE KNOW FROM THE RESEARCH? 1 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.naadac.org/assets/1959/sheedyckwhitterm2009_guiding_ 
principles_and_elements.pdf. 
 95. Id. at 1–2. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Francis T. Cullen et al., Before Adopting Project Hope, Read the Warn-
ing Label: A Rejoinder to Kleiman, Kilmer, and Fisher’s Comment, 78 FED. 
PROBATION 75, 76 (2014). 
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tion are closely examined, concerns that the effects of deter-
rence-based programs will not persist are amplified. For that 
reason, the following subsection reviews what we know about 
the people at whom HOPE is targeted: those on their way to 
prison. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE BEING DETERRED 
Although the HOPE model does not alter sanctions based 
on the individual characteristics of probationers, the identity of 
those under supervision matters in ways relevant to desistance, 
if not to deterrence theory itself. Criminal-justice-involved in-
dividuals are disadvantaged in a number of significant and 
overlapping ways, some well-documented and others less so. 
Most obviously, they are poor.
98
 They are also disproportionate-
ly black and brown.
99
 
 
 98. Estimates suggest that more than eighty percent of felony defendants 
are indigent, though with no reliable national statistics on the question, it is 
difficult to know for certain. See generally Erica J. Hashimoto, Class Matters, 
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 31, 60 (2011) (“[A]vailable data indicate that 
almost eighty percent of felony defendants in state courts in the seventy-five 
largest counties have court-appointed representation. . . . In other words, less 
than a fifth of the population was charged with seventy-eight percent of the 
felonies in criminal cases across the country.”). What is clear is that public de-
fenders represent millions of indigent people in criminal cases every year. See 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE 
FACT SHEET (2011), available at http://ojp.gov/newsroom/factsheets/ojpfs_ 
indigentdefense.html. Indigence reflects more than conventional poverty; 
while standards vary from one jurisdiction to the next, people who qualify as 
indigent for appointment of counsel must usually fall at or close to the federal 
poverty line—an amount that reflects the minimum income needed to avoid 
malnutrition, not the amount needed to pay a lawyer to offer meaningful rep-
resentation in a criminal case. Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Measuring Poverty: A 
New Approach, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1993, 1995 (1996) (book review). 
 99. See Sharon L. Davies, Study Habits: Probing Modern Attempts To As-
sess Minority Offender Disproportionality, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sum-
mer 2003, at 17. Nationally, the rate of incarceration is nearly six times higher 
for African American men, three times higher for Native American men, and 
two times higher for Latino men than it is for white men. See JOHN 
PAWASARAT & LOIS M. QUINN, EMP’T & TRAINING INST. UNIV. OF WIS.-
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN’S MASS INCARCERATION OF AFRICAN AMERICAN 
MALES: WORKFORCE CHALLENGES FOR 2013, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://www4.uwm.edu/eti/2013/BlackImprisonment.pdf. Among women, “black 
females were imprisoned at more than twice the rate of white females” in 
2013. CARSON, supra note 39, at 8. Disparities are particularly pronounced for 
African Americans. Although only 13.6% of the population is African Ameri-
can, almost 40% of the prison population is black. See id. at 15; SONYA 
RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 3 
(2011); see also Michael Tonry & Matthew Melewski, The Malign Effects of 
Drug and Crime Control Policies on Black Americans, 37 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2 
(2008) (“Blacks constitute 12.8 percent of the general population in 2005 but 
nearly half of prison inmates and 42 percent of Death Row residents.”). 
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But there are other, less obvious ways in which individuals 
who end up incarcerated are disadvantaged that matter to 
their prospects for both short-term deterrence and long-term 
desistance. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, sixty-
eight percent of state prisoners have less than a high-school 
education.
100
 The reasons for this vary, and include not only ed-
ucational disruptions due to criminal behavior, but also insta-
bility in families and homes, the need to secure income for or 
provide labor assistance to families, and unmet learning 
needs.
101
 Among those without a high school diploma, 59% suf-
fered from a diagnosed speech disability, 66% had a diagnosed 
learning disability, and 37% had additional disabilities.
102
  
Closely related to learning and language deficits are im-
pulsivity and deficits in attention. Studies have consistently 
found higher rates of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD) among prisoners than those found in the general popu-
lation.
103
 Those with ADHD struggle with impulse control and 
problem-solving, and are, consequently, at heightened risk for 
involvement with the justice system.
104
 
Importantly, mental illness is dramatically more prevalent 
among prisoners than it is in the general population,
105
 with 
 
 100. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EDUCATION AND 
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS 1 (2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf. More specifically, “[a]bout 75% of State prison in-
mates, almost 59% of Federal inmates, and 69% of jail inmates did not com-
plete high school.” Id. at 3. In 2004, the average North Carolinian entering 
prison had an eleventh grade education, read at the ninth grade level, and 
completed math problems at the seventh grade level. OFFICE OF RESEARCH & 
PLANNING, N.C. DEP’T OF CORR., EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF INMATES 
ENTERING NORTH CAROLINA’S PRISONS 1 (2005). 
 101. According to a Bureau of Justice Statistics report: “Over a third of jail 
inmates and a sixth of the general population said the main reason they quit 
school was because of academic problems, behavior problems, or lost interest. 
About a fifth of jail inmates and two-fifths of the general population gave eco-
nomic reasons for leaving school, primarily going to work, joining the military, 
or needing money.” HARLOW, supra note 100, at 3. 
 102. Id. at 1. Striking as these statistics are, they are highly conservative 
estimations, since most prisons do not routinely test for learning and commu-
nicative deficits. 
 103. See Amelia M. Usher et al., Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in 
a Canadian Prison Population, 36 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 311 (2013) (“While 
there is a wide range of rates estimated for ADHD in adult forensic popula-
tions, most are considerably higher than among non-offender populations 
. . . .”). 
 104. See generally Jason Fletcher & Barbara Wolfe, Long-Term Conse-
quences of Childhood ADHD on Criminal Activities, 12 J. MENTAL HEALTH 
POL’Y ECON. 119 (2009). 
 105. Jeffrey L. Metzner et al., Treatment in Jails and Prisons, in 
TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 211 (Robert M. 
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significant mental illness estimated to run at a rate three to 
four times higher in the prison population than in the general 
population.
106
 Approximately 15% of state prisoners reported 
symptoms consistent with a psychotic disorder, along with 24% 
of jail inmates.
107
 A total of 56.2% of state prisoners reported 
one or more mental health problems—a figure far greater than 
the 11% of people in the general population who suffer from 
similar mental health problems.
108
  
The prevalence of educational deficits, learning and lan-
guage disabilities, and mental illness among potential proba-
tioners has important implications for correctional supervision. 
In this respect, many of the challenges that arise in a correc-
tional setting are clearly analogous to those faced by probation-
ers:  
Prison order and discipline is built on oral communications and ex-
pectations of compliance and self-regulation. If one has difficulty in 
that realm, the troubles cascade and build on each other. This cannot 
be easily explained or understood by the inmate who has likely had a 
lifetime of misunderstanding. In the correctional setting, the deficit 
may reveal itself in more “tickets” and other sanctions. This can cre-
ate an official perception that the inmate is irresponsible, needs to 
learn to be accountable, or does not want to learn and conform to the 
discipline system.
109
 
Similarly, probationers who struggle to order, comprehend, 
and retain information are more likely to struggle with follow-
ing multiple directives simultaneously, which they must do if 
they are to comply with the conditions of their supervision.
110
 
 
Wittstein ed., 1998) (“[S]tudies and clinical experience indicate that 8–19% of 
prisoners have significant psychiatric or functional disabilities and another 
15–20% will require some form of psychiatric intervention during their incar-
ceration.”). 
 106. Risdon N. Slate et al., Training Federal Probation Officers As Mental 
Health Specialists, 68 FED. PROBATION 9 (2004). Studies that rely on prison-
ers’ self-reporting of symptoms yield grimmer results. A 2005 study by the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics found that 43% of state prisoners and 54% of jail in-
mates met the diagnostic criteria for mania, while “23% of state prisoners and 
30% of jail inmates reported symptoms of major depression.” DORIS J. JAMES & 
LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF 
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. 
 107. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 106, at 1. 
 108. Id. at 3. These rates were even higher for female prisoners, with ap-
proximately three-quarters of both state prisoners and jail inmates reporting 
symptoms of one or more mental illnesses. Id. at 2. 
 109. Michele LaVigne & Gregory J. Van Rybroek, Breakdown in the Lan-
guage Zone: The Prevalence of Language Impairments Among Juvenile and 
Adult Offenders and Why It Matters, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 37, 98 
(2011). 
 110. See id. at 59–60 (“Research has consistently shown ‘a strikingly high 
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While probationers with language deficits struggle to under-
stand all that is required of them, those with ADHD may have 
difficulty following through on their obligations due to poor im-
pulse control.
111
 The mentally ill similarly struggle with compli-
ance on the street and in prison environments, where they  
are limited in their ability to cope with the environmental and social 
stressors . . . and to adhere to the highly regimented routine demand-
ed by prisons. This inability to adapt is often a function and symptom 
of mental illness: certain mental disorders are defined by breaks with 
reality and limitations in one’s ability to control emotions and behav-
ior.
112
 
Many of the same challenges exist for mentally ill proba-
tioners. In fact, because probationers lack the staffing and close 
supervision found in the prison environment, some may strug-
gle even more to comply with lengthy lists of conditions.
113
 
Complying with probation orders means having the capacity to 
plan ahead to avoid conflicts with work, meet child care obliga-
tions, attend mandatory programs and court appointments, and 
budget to meet basic costs of living, all while making restitu-
tion payments and paying mandatory supervision fees. Many of 
these requirements are difficult to accomplish in the singular—
in the aggregate they quickly overwhelm those probationers 
who are already disadvantaged by illness or other disability. 
The degree to which individuals in prison are disadvantaged 
may elicit sympathy, but for proponents of deterrence-based 
programs, it is also likely to elicit the fundamental question “so 
what?” HOPE does not accommodate the mentally ill or adjust 
punishment to reflect the relative ability of each probationer to 
 
[though] less than perfect comorbidity of language and learning disabilities 
with a range of behavioral and emotional disturbances’ such as anxiety, de-
pression, hyperactivity, frustration, impulsivity and conduct disorders.” (cita-
tion omitted)). 
 111. In this context, too, the experience of prisoners is instructive: 
“[o]ffenders with ADHD may have more trouble adjusting to the constraints of 
incarceration as well as increased difficulty following the rules of the institu-
tion and managing relationships with other offenders.” Amelia M. Usher et al., 
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder in a Canadian Prison Population, 36 
INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 311, 312 (2013). One study found that prisoners with 
high levels of ADHD symptoms were “2.5 times more likely to incur an institu-
tional charge during their sentence although even moderate levels of ADHD 
symptoms predicted poorer institutional behavior.” Id. at 314. 
 112. E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 147, 170–71 (2013). 
 113. For a discussion of some of the ways in which probation agencies are 
responding to the needs of mentally ill probationers through specialty case-
loads, see generally Sarah M. Manchak et al., High-Fidelity Specialty Mental 
Health Probation Improves Officer Practices, Treatment Access, and Rule 
Compliance, 38 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 450 (2014). 
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comply with the court’s expectations. And yet, even without 
those modifications, the program has been shown to improve 
overall compliance by probationers.
114
 Moreover, the relative 
success of program participants suggests that most HOPE pro-
bationers get the message that punishment should be avoided. 
Despite all their deficits, these successful probationers seem to 
“pull it together” enough to avoid repeating violations that are 
likely to get them sanctioned. That is a victory in the eyes of 
HOPE supporters because it shows that a substantial number 
of probationers can be forced to stay on the straight and narrow 
without expensive interventions like mental health counseling 
or close case management. And given the resource constraints 
courts and correctional agencies face,
115
 that is sure to be wel-
come news to criminal justice administrators.  
As well taken as those defenses may be, the vulnerabilities 
and deficits of probationers matter to more than just deter-
rence. Compliance can signal many things. In its best form, it 
indicates that a probationer is taking responsibility for his past 
wrongs and present conduct, is ordering his life in a way that is 
not directed to crime, and is submitting to the legitimate au-
thority of the state. But it can also mean that a probationer has 
been cowed into submission, is temporarily and superficially 
acquiescent, or has grown content to let others order the details 
of his days.  
Many of the factors that influence desistance from crime 
bear little connection to the conditions imposed by sentences of 
community supervision. Some of these factors are outright in-
hibited by the strict, formulaic enforcement of rules required by 
programs like HOPE. When probationers are subject to rules 
that needlessy restrict their freedom, they are infantilized and 
disempowered. And even when rules promote desistance on 
their face (by prohibiting drug use or requiring periodic meet-
ings with a probation officer), punishing their violation without 
accounting for the context in which they were violated is a lost 
opportunity for identifying the challenges—whether material or 
psychological—that must be overcome in order to advance the 
process of desistance.  
While custodial sanctions are sometimes warranted, reflex-
ively imposing jail time for all violations, however minor or un-
 
 114. Hawken, supra note 37, at 37. 
 115. See, e.g., JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF 
UNDER-RESOURCING PUBLIC DEFENSE (2011), available at http://www. 
justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/system_overload_final.pdf 
(describing the overburdened public defender system). 
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derstandable, interferes with probationers’ ability to forge 
longer-term supports in the community by maintaining em-
ployment and engaging meaningfully with family members—
something they cannot do while locked in a jail cell.
116
 Probation 
does not last forever, and a primary goal of supervision must be 
to “connect with and activate internal values within wrongdo-
ers with the goal of encouraging self-regulatory law-related be-
havior in the future.”
117
 To the degree that pure deterrence con-
flicts with that goal, its primacy should be questioned.  
C. THE ROLE OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
Although many aspects of desistance relate directly to the 
environment and personal narrative of the individual offender, 
there is another aspect of desistance that is more outwardly fo-
cused. When people trust the legitimacy of the institutions that 
enforce the law, their rates of compliance with the law in-
crease.
118
 When people “experience the criminal justice system 
and its authorities as acting justly,” research indicates that 
they will follow the law willingly, without need for threat of 
sanction.
119
 Consequently, it is important for courts and proba-
tion agencies to pay attention to the factors that promote a 
sense of legitimacy if they wish to promote sustained de-
sistance. 
HOPE advocates have long been aware of the importance 
of procedural justice and have suggested that the consistency of 
HOPE’s response to violations makes people feel treated fairly 
because all probationers’ violations are sanctioned in the same 
way.
120
 While advocates are right that perceptions about fair-
ness matter, research in procedural justice suggests those per-
ceptions are shaped by factors for which HOPE does not ade-
quately account.
121
  
 
 116. See Nagin, supra note 9, at 200 (stating that there is “little evidence of 
a specific deterrent effect arising from the experience of imprisonment com-
pared with the experience of noncustodial sanctions”).  
 117. Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Justice and Procedural Justice: Dealing 
with Rule Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307, 307 (2006). 
 118. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4–56 (2006). 
 119. Tyler, supra note 117, at 309. 
 120. See Hawken, supra note 37, at 41 (“The consistent application of a be-
havioral contract improves compliance.”).  
 121. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective 
Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. REV. RES. 283, 286 (2003) (“[While officials] 
can and often do compel obedience through the threat or use of force, they can 
also gain the cooperation of the people with whom they deal. Cooperation and 
consent—‘buy in’—are important because they facilitate immediate acceptance 
and long-term compliance. People are more likely to adhere to agreements and 
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Perhaps counterintuitively, people’s judgments about legit-
imacy have little to do with the outcome of past contacts with 
the legal system.
122
 Instead, their judgments turn on several 
key factors, including the perceived impartiality and fairness of 
the decisionmaker and their opportunity to tell their stories 
and have their explanations meaningfully considered by the 
decisionmaker before judgment is imposed.
123
 Closely related is 
the degree to which they feel they have been treated with dig-
nity.
124
  
While HOPE administrators may speak respectfully and 
impose the same punishment on everyone, if they offer proba-
tioners no meaningful opportunity to explain the reasons for 
their violations—to hear from probationers about the ways in 
which their life challenges may be affecting their ability to 
comply with the mountain of conditions to which they are sub-
ject—they are unlikely to retain legitimacy in the eyes of those 
subject to sanction. And if the sanctioning process reduces per-
ceptions of fairness, then regardless whether HOPE promotes 
compliance during the term of supervision, it will reduce the 
odds that the probationer will internalize the law’s legitimacy 
and thereby decrease the probationer’s odds of long-term com-
pliance with the law. 
To make this problem more concrete, consider a form of 
disadvantage probationers experience that has not previously 
been discussed. For those involved in deterrence-based correc-
tional programs, life experiences of trauma—often at the hands 
of authority figures—are nearly universal. Whether that trau-
ma involved direct physical or sexual abuse or the first-hand 
observation of extreme violence (murders, rapes, etc.) as an in-
nocent bystander, people who have been incarcerated (who 
closely resemble the high-risk probationers who are most likely 
to participate in deterrence-based correctional programs) have 
almost all been exposed to traumatic events, often repeatedly.
125
 
 
follow rules over time when they ‘buy into’ the decisions and directives of legal 
authorities.”). 
 122. TYLER, supra note 118, at 163–64. 
 123. See id. (describing the meaning of procedural justice). 
 124. See id.; Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil 
Commitment Hearing, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 44 (1999) (explaining 
that the subject’s involvement in the legal process affects perceptions of those 
processes by the subject). 
 125. Studies of prisoners reveal devastatingly high rates of trauma. See, 
e.g., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., ESSENTIAL COMPONENTS OF TRAUMA-INFORMED JUDICIAL 
PRACTICE 2 (2013), available at http://www.nasmhpd.org/docs/NCTIC/ 
JudgesEssential_5%201%202013finaldraft.pdf (discussing studies on trauma); 
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For some, this exposure will lead to post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD), a serious mental illness, characterized by flash-
backs to traumatic events, memory gaps, avoidant behaviors, 
and sometimes violent outbursts.
126
 Even for those without 
PTSD, trauma can leave lasting effects. When trauma is expe-
rienced in youth, it can affect the developing brain, leaving 
trauma survivors with impaired activity in the areas of the 
brain that regulate “emotion, memory and behavior.”
127
 These 
early experiences of trauma can increase the presence of stress 
hormones and affect the brain’s ability to regulate stress and 
engage logical problem-solving skills.
128
 Experiences of trauma 
have been closely correlated with substance abuse,
129
 problems 
sustaining interpersonal relationships,
130
 and difficulty sustain-
ing attention.
131
  
For those with past experiences of trauma, many basic fea-
tures of the criminal justice system can cause traumatic re-
sponses by reviving memories—and sometimes even physical 
 
JUSTICE POLICY INST., HEALING INVISIBLE WOUNDS: WHY INVESTING IN 
TRAUMA-INFORMED CARE FOR CHILDREN MAKES SENSE 5 (2010), available at 
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-07_REP_ 
HealingInvisibleWounds_jj-ps.pdf (“Studies . . . report that between 75–93 
percent of youth entering the juvenile justice system annually are estimated to 
have experienced some degree of traumatic victimization.”); JESSICA REICHERT 
& LINDSAY BOSTWICK, ILL. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. AUTH., POST-TRAUMATIC 
STRESS DISORDER AND VICTIMIZATION AMONG FEMALE PRISONERS IN ILLINOIS 
8 (2010), available at http://www.icjia.state.il.us/public/pdf/ResearchReports/ 
PTSD_Female_Prisoners_Report_1110.pdf (finding among women in an Illi-
nois prison that 98% had suffered physical abuse and 75% had been sexually 
abused); CARON ZLOTNICK, TREATMENT OF INCARCERATED WOMEN WITH 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER, FINAL REPORT 3 
(2002), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/195165.pdf (re-
porting “that 78 to 85% of incarcerated women have experienced at least one 
traumatic event”). 
 126. See, e.g., REICHERT & BOSTWICK, supra note 125, at 11 (finding that 
sixty percent of female prisoners interview qualified for a PTSD diagnosis). 
 127. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 
125, at 2 (describing the effects of childhood trauma). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Kathleen T. Brady et al., Substance Abuse and Posttraumatic 
Stress Disorder, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 206, 206 (2004) (re-
porting that 36–50% of people who seek treatment for substance abuse disor-
ders meet the diagnostic criteria for PTSD). 
 130. See generally Melanie Randall & Lori Haskell, Trauma-Informed Ap-
proaches to Law: Why Restorative Justice Must Understand Trauma and Psy-
chological Coping, 36 DALHOUSIE L.J. 501 (2013) (describing the importance of 
understanding trauma in the legal context). 
 131. See generally NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, EFFECTS OF 
COMPLEX TRAUMA, available at http://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/assets/ 
pdfs/impact_of_complex_trauma_final.pdf (describing the impact of complex 
trauma). 
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sensations—associated with past harm.
132
  
Re-traumatization refers to the psychological and physiological expe-
rience of being “triggered,” perhaps by a smell, a sound, or a sensa-
tion, that recreates or recalls the original abuse. Triggers for re-
traumatization may include strip searches, room searches that in-
volve inspecting personal items, cuffs or restraints, isolation, sudden 
room changes, yelling, and insults . . . . All these experiences keep old 
wounds open and may invoke habitual, self-protective responses, in-
cluding violent outbursts and withdrawal from treatment.
133
 
For these individuals—particularly those whose trauma 
was rooted in physical abuse—fair process takes on heightened 
importance, since many of the routine aspects of sanctioning 
(such as forcible arrest and confinement) may be re-
traumatizing to a degree that not only exceeds the bounds of 
proportional punishment, but that also creates obstacles to the 
individual’s long-term behavioral and emotional health. 
When the only questions relevant to the court are whether 
a violation occurred and what amount of custody should be im-
posed as a result, probationers lose the ability to tell their story 
and have it meaningfully considered by the judge. While in 
many cases, the explanations probationers will offer will not 
justify deviation from the usual punishment—taking personal 
responsibility for decisions is an important component of a de-
sistance narrative, after all
134
—in other cases, the violation will 
be mitigated by life circumstances that matter in terms of cul-
pability. A relapse triggered by contact with a former assailant 
or by a fresh assault is qualitatively different from a relapse 
precipitated by a night of partying with friends. Similarly, the 
probationer who misses an appointment because of a sick child 
or mandatory overtime at work should be entitled to explain 
her situation to the court. Prohibiting the court from consider-
ing the circumstances of a violation and factoring those circum-
stances into a decision about whether or how much to punish 
decreases confidence in the fundamental fairness of probation. 
Justice in this context matters intrinsically, of course. But it al-
so matters instrumentally. While such sanctioning may deter 
immediate violations of the conditions of probation, it does so at 
the cost of decreasing probationers’ long-term prospects for 
compliance with the law. 
 
 132. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., supra note 125, 
at 5. 
 133. Id. at 2. 
 134. See MARUNA, supra note 1, at 148–51 (explaining the role of “I” in re-
demption narratives). 
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  CONCLUSION: PURPOSE MATTERS   
HOPE was one judge’s response to a probation system that 
was broken: before HOPE, rules of supervision were ignored 
with impunity until they reached a sudden tipping point, when 
the punishment became the sudden and severe sanction of full 
revocation.
135
 In the face of that broken system, Judge Alm de-
vised an innovative way to improve the effectiveness of proba-
tion. That kind of robust innovation should be lauded by aca-
demics and policymakers alike.  
But all innovations can easily become routine conventions. 
Soon enough, HOPE will be “probation as usual” in many juris-
dictions around the country. And therein lies potential danger, 
not just for HOPE but for any innovation. Having justified the 
need for a new model of probation and having persuaded our-
selves that it is better than what existed before, it is easy to 
stop asking whether the program best advances the ultimate 
purpose of probation: assisting people in becoming productive, 
law-abiding citizens, not only during the period of supervision, 
but afterward. HOPE may well be the best program on the 
market for deterring probationers from violating conditions of 
supervision. But complying perfectly with rules is not the high-
est good we should be seeking to promote. Probation is not fun-
damentally about human conditioning; it is about engaging 
with autonomous moral agents in the process of behavioral 
change. Doing so requires considering the context of violations 
when selecting punishment, and imposing sanctions that are 
proportional to the infraction that has occurred. In many cases, 
HOPE achieves that result, but in others it does not.  
Like Judge Alm, advocates of HOPE often analogize the 
practices of deterrence-based programs to good parenting, 
where consistency is key. But there are differences between 
parenting and HOPE that matter. Good parents always consid-
er context when responding to rule violations, and when they 
impose consequences on their children, they never use cages.  
While the role of the state can never mirror wholly the role of a 
benign parent, it can go further in fairly and parsimoniously 
sanctioning rule violations. Our courts must leave room for un-
derstanding why violations occur and for responding in ways 
that are proportional to the culpability of the violator, as well 
as the severity of the infraction.  
Moreover, while custody is in some cases appropriate, we 
 
 135. See KLEIMAN, supra note 65, at 4 (explaining how the U.S. criminal 
justice system could avoid unnecessary incarcerations). 
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must do better to develop noncustodial penalties that hold pro-
bationers accountable without impeding probationers’ ability to 
stay connected to the informal and prosocial influences of em-
ployment, family, and community that lead to long-term de-
sistance from crime. The idea that incarceration is the quan-
tum and kind of punishment required in order to achieve 
accountability is a uniquely American phenomenon, driven in 
all likelihood by our confusion about scale. Our criminal justice 
system punishes so harshly and so often that jail seems like a 
“micro-sanction” simply because it is so much less punitive 
than the revocation sentences to which we have become accus-
tomed.
136
 It is important to recognize that the ways in which we 
are executing punishment may be doing significant harm even 
if they also increase probationers’ compliance with the condi-
tions of supervision.  
Creating a more responsive system does not require costly 
new programs or unrealistic expansion of the current criminal 
justice infrastructure. In places that use deterrence-based cor-
rectional programs, probation officers already spend time meet-
ing with higher-risk probationers and bringing them before the 
court for sanctioning. Adding to those meetings a conversation 
about how the probationer is doing and why he is having diffi-
culty complying with certain conditions does not take much 
time and can yield valuable insights into the root causes of of-
fending for a particular individual, opening up possibilities for 
new ways of engaging the probationer and connecting him to 
prosocial influences in the community. In fact, many probation 
agencies across the country are already training their agents to 
engage in just such conversations through the use of motiva-
tional interviewing and counseling techniques designed to in-
crease probationers’ motivation to change and take ownership 
of the solutions to their own problems.
137
  
 
 136. See generally ROBERT A. FERGUSON, INFERNO: AN ANATOMY OF 
AMERICAN PUNISHMENT (2014) (discussing the harsh sanctioning unique to 
the American penal system). As an example of a way in which our sanctioning 
defies what we know of human behavior, consider that psychological research 
has repeatedly confirmed that people are more motivated to change more by 
praise than by condemnation from those who have power over them. See, e.g., 
Judy Cameron et al., Achievement-Based Rewards and Intrinsic Motivation: A 
Test of Cognitive Mediators, 97 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 641 (2005). Even so, HOPE 
utilizes no positive rewards other than decreases in frequency of drug testing 
over time. 
 137. See, e.g., SCOTT T. WALTERS ET AL., MOTIVATING OFFENDERS TO 
CHANGE: A GUIDE FOR PROBATION AND PAROLE 1–9 (2007), available at 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.nicic.gov/Library/022253.pdf (explaining the 
benefits of motivational interviews). 
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Leaving room to consider context when sanctioning does 
not mean abandoning accountability. Probation officers can re-
spond to violations themselves or ask courts to impose sanc-
tions that reflect the genuine variation in individual culpability 
for offending. A relapse occasioned by abuse can result in a re-
ferral for trauma counseling; missing an appointment can be 
sanctioned by the imposition of community service hours or a 
temporary increase in the frequency of reporting. Failure to pay 
restitution can be sanctioned by an increase in the monthly 
payment if the failure was willful, or it can be addressed by a 
decrease in the monthly obligation if the failure is due to genu-
ine poverty. Imposing proportional, sensible sanctions is a task 
that requires little more than imagination and good sense. We 
do no less for our children and employees, and expect no less for 
ourselves from our superiors. To say that less is warranted in 
the context of correctional supervision, where probationers’ 
needs are high and the requirements placed upon them signifi-
cant, is to sanction potential injustice in the name of efficiency. 
For all of their promise, programs like HOPE (and the 
compliance they promote) cannot become ends unto themselves. 
Instead, like any criminal justice intervention, deterrence-
based correctional programs must be used as tools to advance 
the larger goal of empowering probationers to desist from 
crime—to trade criminality and addiction for more mature, 
prosocial modes of living. And when the requirements of deter-
rence impede the larger goal of promoting desistance, promot-
ing desistance should trump deterrence. 
 
